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Abstract—Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cy-
ber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient net-
worked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable
services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage
game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure
protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the
infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected
before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to discon-
nect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for
creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize
their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use
the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize
the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We
derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We
further investigate the resilience planning of the defender and
the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use
case studies of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster
recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
Index Terms—Dynamic Games, Security, Resilience, Infras-
tructure Networks, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure networks are increasingly connected due to
the integration of the information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs). For example, the introduction of smart meters
has enabled the communications between the users and the
utility companies. Communications with roadside units in
vehicular networks can provide safety warnings and traffic
information. However, infrastructure networks are vulnerable
to not only physical attacks (e.g., terrorism, theft or van-
dalisms) but also cyber attacks. These attacks can damage the
connectivity of the infrastructure system and thus results in
the performance degradation and operational dysfunction. For
instance, an adversary can attack the road sensor units and cre-
ate traffic congestion [1]. As a result, the transportation system
can break down due to the loss of roads. An adversary can also
launch denial-of-service attacks to disconnect communication
networks [2], resulting in inaccessibility of relevant database
for air travel or financial transactions.
The cyber-physical nature of the infrastructure can also en-
able the coordinated attacks on the infrastructure systems that
allow an adversary to use both cyber and physical approaches
to disconnect networks. Therefore, infrastructure protection
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plays a significant role to maintain the connectivity of the
infrastructure networks. One way to protect the network is
to create redundant links in the network so that networks
can be still connected despite arbitrary removal of links.
This approach has been used in traffic networks by creating
multiple modes of transportation, in communication networks
by adding extra wired or wireless links, and in supply chain
networks by making orders from multiple suppliers.
Adding link redundancy is an effective approach when there
is no knowledge of the target of the attacker, and thus the
objective of the network designer is to secure the network by
making the network robust to arbitrary removal of a fixed num-
ber of links. However, it becomes expensive and sometimes
prohibitive when the cost for creating links is costly, and the
attacker is powerful. Therefore, a paradigm shift to emphasize
the recovery and response to attacks is critical, and the
infrastructure resilience becomes essential for developing post-
attack mechanisms to mitigate the impacts. Recovering the
network from attack is a top priority for designers especially
in the service-oriented critical infrastructures including electric
power and communication networks [3]. With a limited budget
of resources, it is essential to develop an optimal post-attack
healing mechanism as well as a pre-attack secure mechanism
holistically and understand the fundamental tradeoffs between
security and resilience in the infrastructures.
To this end, we establish a two-player dynamic three-stage
network game formation problem in which the infrastructure
network designer aims to keep the network connected before
and after the attack, while the objective of the adversary is to
keep the network disconnected after the attack. Note that each
player has a cost on creating or removing links. Specifically,
at the first stage of the game, the infrastructure network
designer first creates a network with necessary redundancies
by anticipating the impact of adversarial behavior. Then, an
adversary attacks at the second stage by removing a minimum
number of links of the network. At the last stage of the game,
the network designer can recover the network after the attack
by adding extra links to the attacked network.
The resilience of the network is characterized by the capa-
bility of the network to maintain connectivity after the attack
and the time it takes to heal the network. The security of
the infrastructure is characterized by the capability of the
network to withstand the attack before healing. Adding a large
number of redundancies to the network can prevent the attack
from disconnecting the network, but this approach can be
costly. Hence, it is important to make strategic decisions and
planning to yield a protection and recovery mechanism for the
infrastructure with a minimum cost.
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We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) as
the solution concept of the dynamic game. We observe that
with sufficient capabilities of recovery, the infrastructure can
mitigate the threats by reducing the incentives of the attackers.
We analyze SPE of the game by investigating two different
parameter regimes. Further, we develop an optimal post-
attack network healing strategy to recover the infrastructure
network. When an attacker is powerful (attack cost is low), we
observe that the defender needs to allocate more resources in
securing the network to reduce the incentives of the attacker.
In addition, agile resilience and fast response to attacks are
crucial in mitigating the cyber threats in the infrastructures.
In the infrastructure network, agile resilience requires more
effort of the network designer. Thus, when taking the resilience
cost into account, the designer selects a mechanism including
the defense and recovery strategies as well as the resilience
ability jointly that yields the best net payoff. The attacker can
also be strategic in choosing its attacking time. We find that
when the defender does not recover the network, the attacker
prefers to attack in an early phase and receives the total
rewards afterward. In contrast, the attacker chooses to com-
promise the network at a later phase (though he does not really
attack since the network is not connected initially), extracting
all the utility from the initial time until the attacking phase. We
finally use case studies on communication networks recovery
based on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to illustrate our
obtained theoretical results.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We establish a two-player three-stage dynamic game
framework to study the secure and resilient infrastructure
network design. By considering the costs for creating and
removing links, the network defender aims to keep the
network connected while otherwise for the attacker.
2) We provide a complete analysis of the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game which includes
the defense and recovery strategies of the network de-
fender and the attacking strategy of the adversary.
3) We derive constructive results on the resilience planning
which specifies the optimal response time to attacks for
the defender as well as the strategic timing of attack that
determines when to compromise for the adversary.
A. Related Work
Communication network connectivity plays an important
role in information exchange in various scenarios including
civilian and military applications. To enhance the network
connectivity against attacks, a number of methods have been
proposed including two-way cooperative network formation
[4], secrecy graph approach [5], and q-composite scheme
[6]. Our work aims to improve the network connectivity by
strategically investing link resources.
Security is a critical concern for infrastructure networks [7]–
[9]. In [10], the authors have used bilevel and trilevel opti-
mization models to design secure critical infrastructure against
terrorist attacks. [11] has provided a comprehensive survey
on cyber security of critical infrastructures and evaluated the
adversarial impact using an attack-tree-based methodology.
In [12], the authors have investigated secure state estimation
of interdependent critical infrastructures through proposing a
Colonel Blotto game framework and captured the dynamics
of various components holistically using a novel integrated
state-space model. A cross-layer design approach has been
proposed in [13], [14] to optimize the performance of cyber-
physical control systems where the security is modeled using
a game-theoretic framework. To further enhance the system
performance, the strategy designed by the network operator
should take the cascading failure effects into account due to
the couplings between distinct network components [15]–[17].
Cascading failures over networks have been widely studied
in the literature. The authors in [18] have shown that topo-
logical changes are needed to increase cascading robustness,
and improvements in network component tolerance alone do
not ensure system robustness against cascading failures. In
[19], the authors have proposed an evolutionary algorithm to
improve the network performance to cascading failures, and
showed that clustering, modularity, and long path lengths are
critical in designing robust large-scale infrastructure. Further-
more, [20] has proposed a dynamic game-theoretic approach
to investigate the coupling between cyber security policy
and robust control design of industrial control systems under
cascading failures. In addition, [21] and [22] have designed
protective strategies using stochastic games for energy systems
under cascading failures due to attacks. The authors in [23]
have developed strategic security investment strategies in IoT
networks by capturing bounded rationality of players due
to cognitive constraints. Different with previous literature
on analyzing network failures using game approaches, our
work captures the sequential move of attacker and defender
and models the network structure explicitly. Furthermore, by
leveraging dynamic games, graph theory and optimization, we
provide a complete equilibrium analysis of the problem by
considering network security and resilience jointly which is
not a focus in previous works.
In addition to the system security, resilience is another
crucial property that needs to be considered by infrastructure
network designers [24]. In [25], the authors have proposed a
hybrid framework for robust and resilient control design with
applications to power systems by considering both the unan-
ticipated events and deterministic uncertainties. The authors in
[26] have studied the resilience aspect of routing problem in
parallel link communication networks using a two-player game
and designed stable algorithms to compute the equilibrium
strategies. [27] has studied the critical infrastructure resilience
by focusing on two metrics, optimal repair time and resilience
reduction worth, to measure the criticality of various compo-
nents in the system. The network resilience in our framework
is quantified by the recovery time after the attack which needs
to be strategically designed.
Dynamic game approaches have been widely used to in-
vestigate the network security and resilience. For example,
[28] has used a differential game to model the malware
defense in wireless sensor networks where the system designer
chooses strategies to minimize the overall cost. A stochastic
repeated game and an iterative learning mechanism have been
adopted for moving target defense in networks [29]. In [30], a
multistage Stackelberg game has been studied for developing
deceptive routing strategies for nodes in a multihop wireless
communication network. Furthermore, [31] has proposed a
three-player three-stage game-theoretic framework including
two network operators and one attacker to enable the secure
design of multi-layer infrastructure networks. Our framework
is also a three-stage game but differs from [31] since we have
one central network designer and take the system resilience
into account.
The adopted method and framework in our infrastructure
network design are relevant to the recent advances in ad-
versarial networks [32]–[35] and strategic network formation
games [36]–[38]. Furthermore, the current work extends our
previous one [39] in multiple aspects. First, our goal in this
work is to design the optimal protection, resilience planning
and recovery strategies for infrastructure networks in a holistic
manner which differs from [39] in which the critical resilience
planning factor is not considered. Second, we investigate the
new topic of network resilience and the strategic behavior of
attacker in Section V. Third, we provide the detailed proofs of
all theoretical results which were omitted in [39]. Fourth, we
extensively expand the introduction and related work sections
as well as the case studies section with more examples to
explicitly illustrate the newly obtained analytical results.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
formulates the problem. Dynamic game analysis are presented
in Section III. Section IV derives the SPE of the dynamic
game. Network resilience and strategic timing of attack are
investigated in Section V. Case studies are given in Section
VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DYNAMIC GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we consider an infrastructure system repre-
sented by a set N of n nodes. The infrastructure designer can
design a network with redundant links before the attack for
protection and adding new links after the attack for recovery.
Note that the attack action of the adversary can be enabled
through cyber and physical approaches due to the integration
of modern infrastructures with information and communica-
tion technologies. The sequence of the actions taken by the
designer and the attacker is described as follows:
(i) A Designer (D) aims to create a network between these
nodes and protect it against a malicious attack;
(ii) After some time of operation, an Adversary (A) puts an
attack on the network by removing a subset of its links;
(iii) Once the D realizes that an attack has been conducted,
it has the opportunity to heal its network by constructing
new links (or reconstructing some destroyed ones).
In addition, the timing of the actions also play a significant
role in determining the optimal strategies of both players. We
normalize the horizon of the event from the start of the prepa-
ration of infrastructure protection to a time point of interest
as the time internal [0, 1]. This normalization is motivated by
the observation made in [3] where the consequences of fifteen
major storms occurring between 2004 and 2012 are plotted
over a normalized duration of the event. We let τ and τR
represent, respectively, the fraction of time spent before the
attack (system is fully operational) and between the attack
and the healing phase. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
0 τ τ + τR 1
Attack Recovery
Fig. 1: Attack and defense time fractions. The attacker compromises
the network at time τ , and the defender recovers it after τR amount
of time.
The goal of the designer or the defender is to create protec-
tion and recovery mechanisms to keep its network operational,
i.e., connected in this case. Let E1 be the set of links created
by the defender initially (i.e., at time 0). EA ⊆ E1 is the set
of links removed (attacked) by the adversary and E2 is the set
of links created by the defender after the attack (at fraction
τ + τR of the time horizon). Regardless of the time stamp,
creating (resp. removing) links has a unitary cost cD (resp.
cA). The adversary aims to disconnect the network. Thus, for
any set E , we define 1E which equals 1 if the graph (N , E)
is connected and 0 otherwise. Values of τ , τR, cA and cD are
assumed as common knowledge to both D and A first, and
later we investigate the strategic selections of τ and τR. As a
tie-breaker rule, if the output/utility is the same for A, then A
chooses to attack the network with the largest number of link
removals. Similarly, D chooses not to create links if its utility
is the same.
Remark: The link creation cost is treated as identical in
the framework. Here, cD can capture various application
scenarios. For example, in a large complex network with
heterogeneous link costs, analyzing the strategy of D becomes
intractable. A viable choice for D is to consider the mean link
creation cost captured by cD which gives an approximation of
the network. Another case is that D considers the largest single
link creation cost denoted by cD, and thus it captures the worst
case in which D is conservative in designing the strategies. In
sum, considering an identical cD is reasonable, and also it
makes the technical analysis of the problem tractable.
The utility for the designer (resp. adversary) is equal to the
fraction of time the network is connected (resp. disconnected)
minus the costs of creating (resp. removing) the links. Hence,
the payoff functions of the designer and the adversary are
represented by UD and UA, respectively, as follows:
UD(E1, E2, EA) =(1− τ − τR)1E1\EA∪E2 + τ1E1
+τR1E1\EA − cD(|E1|+ |E2|),
UA(E1, E2, EA) =(1− τ − τR)(1− 1E1\EA∪E2)− cA|EA|
+τ(1− 1E1) + τR(1− 1E1\EA),
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. In addition,
1E1\EA∪E2 means that a network including |N | = n nodes
contains a set E1\EA ∪ E2 of links. Note that if the fraction
of time and the cost of links metrics cannot be directly added
up in the utility functions, we can use a conversion factor to
transform one metric to the other. Therefore, the formulated
utility functions for D and A are still valid.
Since both players are strategic, we study the SPE and
analyze the strategies of the players to the sets (E1, EA, E2).
Thus, we seek triplets (E1, EA, E2) such that E2 is a best
response to (E1, EA) and that given E1, (EA, E2) is also a SPE.
In other words, the SPE involves the analysis of the following
three sequentially nested problems starting from the last stage
of the designer’s recovery problem to the first stage of the
designer’s protection problem:
(i) Given the strategies E1 and EA, player D chooses
E∗2 (E1, EA) ∈ argmaxE2 UD(E1, EA, E2);
(ii) Given E1, the adversary chooses
E∗A(E1) ∈ argmaxEA UA(E1, EA, E∗2 (E1, EA));
(iii) Player D chooses
E∗1 ∈ argmaxE1 UD(E1, E∗A(E1), E∗2 (E1, EA)).
The equilibrium solution (E1, EA, E2) that solves the above
three problems consistently is an SPE of the two-player
dynamic game.
Comments on the game formulation: In the established
model, the attacking time τ and attacker’s cost cA are as-
sumed to be known by D. More practically, D may have no
perfect information on the attacker’s parameters, and only the
distributions of τ and cA are available. Then, D can calculate
the expected values of τ and cA. The analysis in the paper
is still valid to design the defensive strategy of D at time 0.
However, A’s behavior may not be the same as expected by
D which leads to a random network after the attack. Thus,
D needs to determine the healing strategy A2 again at time
τ . This creates another layer of decision-making problem for
D which is an optimization problem itself instead of a game
as A’s behavior has been revealed. Other than capturing the
unknown parameters τ and cA through their expected values,
we can also model the game by considering the incomplete
information directly. This yields a formulation of dynamic
Bayesian game with a random type parameter including τ and
cA which is nontrivial to solve.
III. DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the possible configurations of
the infrastructure network at SPE.
We first note that cA should be not too large, since otherwise
A cannot be a threat to D. Similarly, cD should be sufficiently
small so that the D can create a connected network:
Lemma 1. If cA > 1 − τ , then A has no incentive to attack
any link. In addition, if cD > 1n−1 , then D has no incentive
to create a connected network.
Proof. Suppose that cA > 1 − τ . Let E1 be given and φ :=
τ(1 − 1E1). If A decides not to remove any link, then its
payoff is φ+ τR(1− 1E1) + (1− τ − τR)(1− 1E1∪E2) ≥ φ.
Otherwise, |EA| ≥ 1 and UA(E1, E2, EA) ≤ φ+(1−τ−τR)(1−
1E1\EA∪E2)− cA + τR(1− 1E1\EA) ≤ φ+ 1− τ − cA < φ.
Thus, it is a best response for A to play EA = ∅. Similarly,
if cD > 1n−1 , then if D plays E1 = E2 = ∅, its utility is 0.
Otherwise, its utility is bounded above by 1−(n−1)cD which
corresponds to a connected tree network with the minimum
number of links. 
In the following, we thus suppose that cA < 1 − τ and
cD <
1
n−1 .
Note that the SPE can correspond only to a set of situations
summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. Suppose that (E1, EA, E2) is an SPE. Then, we are
necessarily in one of the situations given in Table I.
Situation 1E1 1E1\EA 1E1\EA∪E2
1 1 1 1
2 1 0 1
3 1 0 0
4 0 0 1
5 0 0 0
TABLE I: Different potential combinations of values of 1E1 , 1E1\EA
and 1E1\EA∪E2 at the SPE.
Proof. Note that, in total, 8 situations should be possible.
However, if 1E1 = 0, then it is impossible that 1E1\EA = 1.
Therefore, the situations where (1E1 ,1E1\EA ,1E1\EA∪E2)
equaling to (0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1) are not possible. Further, if
1E1\EA = 1, then it is impossible that 1E1\EA∪E2 = 0. Thus,
the situation (1E1 ,1E1\EA ,1E1\EA∪E2) = (1, 1, 0) is impos-
sible. All other combinations are summarized in Table I. 
In Situations 4 and 5, D does not create a connected
network in the beginning, and thus A has no incentive to attack
the network at phase τ . The structure of the SPE depends
on the values of the parameters of the game. In particular,
it depends on whether D has incentive to fully reconstruct
(heal) the system after the attack of A. More precisely, if
1−τ−τR > (n−1)cD, then D prefers to heal the network even
if all links have been compromised by the attacker. Otherwise,
there should be a minimum number of links remained after
the attack for the D to heal the network at the SPE. We
sequentially analyze these two cases in Sections IV-A and
IV-B, respectively.
IV. SPE ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC GAME
Depending on the parameters, we derive SPE of the dynamic
game in two regimes: 1−τ−τR > (n−1)cD and the otherwise
in this section.
Before presenting the results, we first present the definition
of Harary network [40] which plays an essential role in the
SPE analysis. For a network containing n nodes being resistant
to k link attacks, one necessary condition is that each node
should have a degree of at least k+1, yielding the total number
of links more than
⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
, where d·e denotes the ceiling
operator. Harary network presented below can achieve this
lower bound on the number of required links.
Definition 1 (Harary Network [40]). In a network containing
n nodes, Harary network is the optimal design that uses the
minimum number of links equaling
⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
for the network
still being connected after removing any k links.
The constructive method of general Harary network can
be described with cycles as follows. It first creates the links
between node i and node j such that (|i − j| mod n) = 1,
Fig. 2: Illustration of Harary networks with different number of
nodes and security levels.
and then (|i−j| mod n) = 2, etc. When the number of nodes
is odd, then the last cycle of link creation is slightly different
since (k+1)n2 is not an integer. However, the bound
⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
can be still be achieved. For clarity, we illustrate three cases in
Fig. 2 with n = 5, 7 under different security levels k = 2, 3.
Another critical network topology used in the analysis is
the tree network defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Tree network [41]). A tree is an undirected
graph in which any two nodes are connected by exactly one
path. Equivalently, the network is a tree if and only if it is
connected and acyclic (contains no cycles).
A. Regime 1: 1− τ − τR > (n− 1)cD
In the case where 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD, D always
reconstructs the network to be connected after the attack. The
potential SPE can occur in only three of the Situations in
Table I, and we summarize them in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD and
let kRA ≡
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
, where b·c denotes the floor operator (resp. to
the ceiling operator d·e). Note that kRA is the largest number
of links that A can compromise to have a nonnegative payoff.
Then, the SPE of the game is unique and satisfies:
(1) If τR < cA, then UD = 1 − (n − 1)cD and UA = 0
(Situation 1).
(2) Otherwise, i.e., τR ≥ cA, and
(i) if τ > cD and τR > cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2
⌉
or if τ < cD and
τ + τR > cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2 + 1
⌉
, then the SPE satisfies{
UD = 1− cD
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
UA = 0
(Situation 1).
(ii) If τ > cD and τR < cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2
⌉
, then the SPE
satisfies
{
UD = 1− τR − ncD
UA = τR − cA (Situation 2).
(iii) If τ < cD and τ + τR < cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2 + 1
⌉
, then the
SPE satisfies{
UD = 1− τ − τR − (n− 1)cD
UA = τ + τR
(Situation 4).
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of the following
lemma. Note that the conditions in Proposition 1 are obtained
via comparing D’s utility UD at various SPEs in Table II.
Lemma 3. Suppose that 1−τ−τR > (n−1)cD. The potential
SPEs have the properties given in Table II.
Situation |E1| |EA| |E2| UD UA
1&kRA > 0
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
0 0 1− cD
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
0
1&kRA = 0 n− 1 0 0 1− (n− 1)cD 0
2 n− 1 1 1 1− τR − ncD τR − cA
4 0 0 n− 1 1− τ − τR − (n− 1)cD τ + τR
TABLE II: Different potential SPEs when 1− τ − τR > (n− 1)cD
(Note: kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
).
Proof. First note that any connected network contains at least
n − 1 links. Conversely, any set of nodes can be made
connected by using exactly n − 1 links (any spanning tree
is a solution). We consider a situation where 1E1\EA = 0.
Then, either D decides not to heal the network and receives
a utility of U∗ = τ1E1 − cD|E1|, or it decides to heal it (by
using at most n − 1 links) and receives a utility of at least
U = (1− τ − τR) + τ1E1 − cD(|E1|+ n− 1). The difference
is U −U∗ = (1− τ − τR)− cD(n− 1) > 0. Thus, D always
prefers to heal the network after the attack of A. Therefore,
Situations 3 and 5 contain no SPE.
Next we consider Situation 4. Since 1E1\EA∪E2 = 1, then
D needs to create in total at least n−1 links: |E1|+|E2| ≥ n−1.
Therefore, an optimal strategy is E1 = ∅ and |E2| = n − 1.
Since E1 = ∅, the optimal strategy of A is EA = ∅.
In Situation 2, (N , E1) is connected, and thus |E1| ≥ n−1.
Further, 1E1 = 1 and 1E1\EA = 0, and thus |EA| ≥ 1. Since
1− τ − τR > (n− 1)cD, then A should remove the minimum
number of links to disconnect the network, and we obtain the
result.
Finally, in Situation 1, since 1E1\EA = 1, then D does not
need to create any link during the healing phase: E2 = ∅.
Since 1 − τ − τR > (n − 1)cD, then A attacks at most kRA
links if and only if it obtains a nonnegative reward, i.e., kRA
is the largest integer such that τR − cAkRA ≥ 0 which yields
kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
. Thus, D designs a network that is resistant to an
attack compromising up to kRA links. Such solution network is
the (|N |, kRA + 1)-Harary network [40]. 
Examples: For clarify, we depict the strategies of D and A
at various SPEs using examples shown in Fig. 3. The network
contains 5 nodes. Depending on the relationship between
parameters shown in Proposition 1, the game admits various
SPEs. Four possible SPEs with specific actions taken by D and
A are presented. For example, when the SPE lies in Situation
1 with kRA = 3, then at least 10 links are necessary for the
network being resistant to 3 attacks. Therefore, D creates a
4-Harary network initially in which each node has at least
a degree of 4. In comparison, when kRA = 0 and the SPE
is in Situation 1, then creating a connected tree network is
sufficient for D since A is not capable to compromise any
link. The SPEs corresponding to Situations 2 and 4 are shown
in Figs. 3(c) and 3(d), respectively.
Based on Lemma 3, the stragies of two players at SPE
in regime 1 are summarized as follows. Under Situation 1
and kRA > 0, A does not attack and D creates a connected
(a) Situation 1 and kRA = 3
(b) Situation 1 and kRA = 0
(c) Situation 2
(d) Situation 4
Fig. 3: Strategies of D and A at different SPEs in regime 1. The
network contains 5 nodes. In (a), the SPE is in Situation 1 and kRA =
3. Thus, at least 10 links are necessary for it being resistant to 3
attacks. In (b), when kRA = 0 and the SPE lies in Situation 1, a tree
network is created by the defender following no actions of A and D.
In (c), the SPE is in Situation 2, and A will compromise any one
link at time τ and D will heal one link to reconnect the network.
In (d), D will not protect the network at time 0 but will connect the
network at time τ + τR which shows SPE in Situation 4.
(|N |, kRA + 1)-Harary network at phase 0. Under Situation 1
and kRA = 0, D simply creates a connected network with the
minimum number of n − 1 links which can be achieved by
any tree-structured network, and A admits a null strategy. In
Situation 2, D initially constructs a tree network using n− 1
links, and A attacks any one link at phase τ followed by D
recovering the network at phase τ+τR. Finally, for Situation 4,
A does not attack, and D constructs a connected tree network
only at phase τ + τR.
B. Regime 2: 1− τ − τR < (n− 1)cD
We now consider the case where D has an incentive, at
phase τ+τR, to heal the network if at most k links are required
Fig. 4: The SPE lies in Situation 3 with k = 1. Thus, D will only
create a tree network followed by A compromising any 2 links to
disconnect the network, and D does not recover at time τ + τR.
to reconnect it, where k < n− 1 and
k ≡
⌊
1− τ − τR
cD
⌋
. (1)
We sequentially study the potential SPE in Situations 3, 4
and 5 in Lemma 4, Situation 2 in Lemma 5, and Situation 1
in Lemma 6.
Lemma 4. If 1− τ − τR < (n− 1)cD, we have the following
results:
(i) Any SPE in Situation 3 satisfies E2 = ∅, |EA| = k+1 and
|E1| = n−1, leading to utilities UD = τ−(n−1)cD and
UA = 1− τ − (k+1)cA (occurs only if b 1−τcA c ≥ k+1);
(ii) There exists no SPE in Situation 4;
(iii) The only potential SPE in Situation 5 is the null strategy:
E1 = E2 = EA = ∅, leading to utilities UD = 0 and
UA = 1.
Proof. Suppose that an SPE occurs in Situation 5. Since the
network is always disconnected, then UD = −cD(|E1|+ |E2|).
The maximum utility is obtained when E1 = E2 = ∅. Thus,
EA = ∅.
In Situation 4, since any connected network contains at least
n−1 links, then the maximum utility of D is UD(E1, E2, EA) =
(1 − τ − τR) − cD(n − 1) < 0. Thus, D is better off with a
null strategy (occurring in Situation 5).
In Situation 3, since 1E1 = 1 then |E1| ≥ n − 1. D can
achieves utility value τ−(n−1)cD by playing a tree network.
Since 1E1\EA 6= 1E1 then |EA| ≥ 1 and UA ≤ 1 − τ − cA.
The bound is achieved by attacking any one link created by
D. We further can show that A needs to attack k + 1 links
such that D will not heal the network. 
Example: In regime 2, for SPEs in Situation 5, the net-
work remains empty since D does not protect nor heal. An
illustration of SPE in Situation 3 with k = 1 is depicted in
Fig. 4. Specifically, D creates a connected network with tree
structure initially. Then, A compromises any k + 1 = 2 links
to disconnect the network. Since D is willing to recover at
most k = 1 link, D does not heal the network at time τ + τR.
In the following, we focus on the SPEs in Situations 1
and 2. In both cases, 1E1 = 1. Thus, D creates a connected
network initially. For each node i ∈ N , let di be its degree. To
facilitate the analysis, we focus on the potential best response
strategies of A to E1 which are summarized in the following
three distinct cases:
(i) A does not attack and obtains a utility of U (1)A = 0;
(ii) A attacks sufficiently many links so that the network
admits 2 components, i.e., A attacks exactly min1≤i≤n di
links to disconnect a node of minimal degree. Then, D
heals the network by constructing 1 link, and A receives
utility
U
(2)
A = τR − ( min
1≤i≤n
di)cA. (2)
(iii) A attacks sufficiently many links so that the network
admits ` + 2 components, for some sufficiently large `
(whose exact value is discussed in the following two
lemmas). Then, D does not heal the network, and A
receives utility
U
(3)
A = 1− τ − |EA|cA. (3)
Note that any intermediate value of components in the
range J2; ` + 2K cannot happen at SPE since it amounts
to a lower utility for A. The current case (iii) belongs to
Situation 3 which eases the analysis in Lemmas 5 and 6.
The next lemma characterizes the SPEs for Situation 2.
Lemma 5. The only SPEs in Situation 2 are such that |E1| =
n−1, |EA| = 1, |E2| = 1, UD = 1−τR−ncD, and UA = τR−
cA. Furthermore, it occurs only if cA ≤ τR and
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
>⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
.
Proof. At an SPE in Situation 2, the utility of D is of the
form 1− τR − cD(|E1|+ |E2|). Then, it is a best strategy for
D to heal the network at time τ + τR, i.e., 1 − τR − (|E1| +
|E2|)cD ≥ τ − |E1|cD. Thus, |E2| ≤
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
= k, and k
is the maximum number of links that D can create at time
τ + τR at an SPE. In addition, at this SPE, D receives a
higher reward than by using its best strategy in Situation 3,
i.e., 1−τR−(|E1|+|E2|)cD ≥ τ−(n−1)cD. Thus, |E1|+|E2| ≤⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
+ (n − 1) = k + (n − 1). Since k < n − 1, then
altogether D can create at most |E1|+ |E2| ≤ 2(n− 1) links.
For any SPE in Situation 2, note that |E1| ≥ n − 1.
Thus, we can write |E1| = n − 1 + α and |E2| ≤ k − α,
for some α < k. For Situation 2, we obtain U (2)A ≥ U (1)A
which yields (min1≤i≤n di) ≤
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
. If τR < cA, then no
SPE exists in Situation 2. Further, based on 0 ≤ U (2)A −
U
(3)
A = (|EA| − (min1≤i≤n di))cA − (1− τ − τR), we obtain
|EA| ≥
⌈
1−τ−τR
cA
⌉
+ (min1≤i≤n di). Since at τ + τR, D can
create at most k − α links, then the goal of A in case (iii) is
to create at least ` = k − α + 2 components in the network
(i.e., to create a k − α+ 1 cut). Hence, D constructs E1 in a
way that at least kA+(min1≤i≤n di) links need to be removed
so that the network consists of k + 2− α components, where
kA :=
⌈
1−τ−τR
cA
⌉
.
Recall that k =
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
is the maximal number of links
that D can recover at phase τ + τR. Suppose that k < kA
(i.e., k ≤ kA − 1). Then, for any E1, consider the following
attack: first remove α links so that the resulting network is
a tree and then remove k2 + 1 − α links. Then, the resulting
network has exactly n− 2− k+ α links, i.e., it has n− (n−
2 − k + α) = k − α + 2 components and is obtained using
k + 1 < kA + (min1≤i≤n di) links. Thus, if k < kA, no SPE
in Situation 2 exists. If k > kA + 1 (i.e., k ≥ kA), then we
consider the strategy that D creates a line network at time 0.
Then to induce k + 2 components, A needs to remove k + 1
links. However, due to k > kA+1, it is not of the best interest
to A. Instead, the best response for A is to attack exactly one
link (one being adjacent to one of the nodes with degree 1).
Then, the best strategy for D is to re-create this compromised
link at time τ + τR which is an SPE. It is strategic as it
minimizes the number of created links. 
In Lemma 5, the condition cA ≤ τR ensures that A has
an incentive to compromise the network, and the condition⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
>
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
guarantees that D is capable to
heal the network after the attack. Note that when these two
conditions are satisfied, all other strategies that D creates a tree
network at phase 0 and A attacks one link which is further
reconnected by D also constitute SPEs of Situation 2.
To study the SPE in Situation 1, for convenience, we denote
kRA ≡
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
and kHA ≡
⌊
1− τ
cA
⌋
,
where kRA (resp. k
H
A ) corresponds to the maximal number of
attacks that A is willing to deploy to disconnect the network
during the phase interval [τ, τ + τR] (resp. [τ, 1]) so that U
(2)
A
(resp. U (3)A ) achieves a positive value.
The following lemma characterizes the possible SPEs in
Situation 1.
Lemma 6. If τR/cA > n − 1 or
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
>
⌊
1−τ
cD
⌋
, then no
SPE exists in Situation 1. Otherwise, let
δ =

⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
if k ≥ 1 and kRA > 1,⌈
n(kHA+1)
2
⌉
if k = 0 and kRA > 1,
n if kHA = k + 1 and k
R
A = 1,
n+
⌊
n
k
⌋
+
⌈bnk c
2
⌉
if kHA 6= k + 1 and kRA = 1,
n− 1 if kHA = k and kRA = 0,
n if kHA 6= k and kRA = 0.
(4)
If 1 < δcD or if 1−τ < (δ−n+1)cD, then no SPE in Situation
1 exists. Otherwise, the unique SPE is such that UD = 1−δcD
and UA = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Example: For clarity, an illustration of SPE in Situation
1 with δ = 5 is depicted in Fig. 5. There are 5 nodes in
the network and the parameters are kHA = 2 and k
R
A = 1.
Specifically, D creates a 2-Harary network with the ring
topology initially. Then, A is not capable to attack. The
network remains connected over the entire time period.
For convenience, the results of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 are
summarized in Table III.
We next comment on the strategies of D and A at SPEs.
Specifically, the players’ strategies in Situation 2 under regime
Fig. 5: The SPE lies in Situation 1 with δ = 5 (kHA = 2 and k
R
A = 1).
Thus, D creates a 2-Harary network with the ring topology. A will
not attack and thus D does not heal the network.
Situation |E1| |EA| |E2| UD UA
1 δ 0 0 1− cDδ 0
2 n− 1 1 1 1− τR − ncD τR − cA
3 n− 1 k + 1 0 τ − (n− 1)cD 1− τ − (k + 1)cA
5 0 0 0 0 1
TABLE III: Different potential SPEs when 1− τ − τR < (n− 1)cD
(Note: δ is given by Eq. (4), and k =
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
).
2 are the same as the corresponding ones under regime 1.
In Situation 3, D creates a tree network at time 0 and does
not heal it after A compromising any k + 1 links at phase
τ . Depending on the system parameters, in Situation 1, D
creates a connected network using δ links either in a tree, ring
or Harary network topology, and A does not attack.
Remark: In the previous two Sections IV-A and IV-B,
we have not explicitly determined those SPEs satisfying the
boundary conditions. Note that at boundaries where multiple
SPEs could be feasible, the defender playing a leader role will
first choose the one that yields the highest utility. Then, after
fixing the defender’s strategy, the attacker selects the SPE that
maximizes its payoff.
C. Discussions on Constrained Action Set of A
In some scenarios, A may not be capable to attack a
particular set of links due to constraints. Thus, some links
initially created by D cannot be compromised by A, and
they can be regarded as secure links. The major SPE analysis
of this paper is still valid for this constrained scenario with
extra considerations on A’s feasible action set. We present the
results for this extension in regime 1 briefly as follows, and the
results in regime 2 can be obtained using similar arguments.
First, we consider the case that every node can create at least
one secure link with other nodes. Then the SPE in Situation
1 under kRA > 0 becomes as |E1| = n − 1, |EA| = 0, and
|E2| = 0. In this subcase, D can create a connected network
with all secure links using a tree topology and thus Harary
network, |E1| =
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
, is not optimal to D. Furthermore,
Situation 2 is not possible as the network created by D cannot
be attacked. In addition, Situation 4 remains the same in this
case. We next investigate cases in Situation 2. Indeed, SPE in
Situation 2 occurs if there exists at least a single link in the
tree network created by D at phase 0 which is insecure. Then,
A disconnects the network by compromising this vulnerable
link. Finally, we analyze the case when a subset of nodes
in the network can form secure links with others. In this
Fig. 6: Illustration of network contraction for designing D’s optimal
strategy when a subset of nodes can form secure links with others.
In the example, 6 links are required for the network being resistant
to 2 link removals if A can compromise any link. When links (1,2)
and (1,3) cannot be attacked, nodes 1, 2, and 3 can be aggregrated
as a super node by network contraction. Then, node 4 connects with
the super node using 3 links. In sum, 5 links are sufficient for this
constrained scenario which is different from the unconstrained case.
scenario, the results of Situation 1 & kRA = 0, Situation 2, and
Situation 4 in Table II still hold. For Situation 1 & kRA > 0, D
does not need to create a Harary network at phase 0 as some
created links are secure. To this end, we can leverage network
contraction [35] to derive the SPE. Network contraction refers
to the principle that if there is a secure link between two nodes,
we can aggregate them together and see them as a single super
node. In Situation 1 & kRA > 0, depending on the places where
secure links can be formed, it leads to different policies for D
at phase 0. We illustrate the design principle for Situation 1
& kRA > 0 in Fig. 6. In this example, |E1| = 5 is sufficient in
the constrained scenario for D to construct a secure network
at time 0, while it requires |E1| = 6 links in the unconstrained
counterpart.
V. NETWORK RESILIENCE AND STRATEGIC ATTACK
In this section, we investigate the impact of network re-
silience on the SPE of the dynamic game and the attacker’s
behavior on the timing of attack.
A. Resilience Planning
The infrastructure network resilience is measured by the
response and recovery time after the cyber attack which is τR
in our scenario. Thus, instead of merely maximizing UD, the
network operator should also take resilience metric τR into
account. Thus, the aggregated objective function of D can be
formulated as follows:
FD(E1, E2, EA, τR) = UD(E1, E2, EA)−RD(τR), (5)
where RD : [0, 1] → [0, 1] quantifies the normalized system
resilience cost. Specifically, RD is a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to τR. By considering the SPE of the
dynamic game, D chooses the best τR that results in an
optimal utility FD.
Based on Section IV, we obtain the following results. In
regime 1 with agile resilience, i.e., τR < 1− τ − (n− 1)cD,
the utilities of D under various SPE are summarized in Table
IV.
Situation FD
1&kRA > 0 1− cD
⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
−RD(τR)
1&kRA = 0 1− (n− 1)cD −RD(τR)
2 1− τR − ncD −RD(τR)
4 1− τ − τR − (n− 1)cD −RD(τR)
TABLE IV: Utilities of D under different potential SPE when 1 −
τ − τR > (n− 1)cD (Note: kRA =
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
).
Similarly, in regime 2 with τR > 1 − τ − (n − 1)cD, D’s
utilities with different scenarios are presented in Table V.
Situation FD
1 1− cDδ −RD(τR)
2 1− τR − ncD −RD(τR)
3 τ − (n− 1)cD −RD(τR)
5 0
TABLE V: Utilities of D under different potential SPE when 1 −
τ − τR < (n− 1)cD (Note: δ is given by Eq. (4)).
Remark: Under different regimes and situations, the aggre-
gated payoff FD of D admits various forms. Comparing the
values of FD in Tables IV and V, the designer selects a τR that
yields the largest FD, and the corresponding SPE strategies
can be determined based on Tables II and III.
B. Strategic Timing of Attack
The attacker’s behavior depends on the recovery ability of
the network. When A decides to compromise the network, then
choosing the attacking phase τ also becomes a critical issue.
Specifically, for a given τR, A needs to decide the value of τ .
As shown in Lemma 2, A compromises the network only if D
creates a connected network initially. Thus, we focus on two
Situations: 2 and 3. Proposition 1 indicates that when Situation
2 is an SPE, the corresponding utility of A is UA = τR − cA
which does not depend on the attacking phase τ . In an SPE
of Situation 3, D does not heal the network after attack, and
the utility of A is UA = 1− τ − (k+1)cA. Hence, the timing
of attack τ has an influence on A’s payoff. In another case
when SPE takes a form of Situation 4, A’s utility is τ + τR
which is also influenced by the attacking phase. Despite that
A does not attack, its action induces a threat to the network.
We summarize the results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. When SPE of the game admits a form of Situation
3, then the best timing of attack for A is to choose the smallest
τ in the set {τ ∣∣τ ≥ 1−τR(n−1)cD , ⌊ 1−τcA ⌋ ≥ ⌊ 1−τ−τRcD ⌋ + 1}.
UAV-based 
comm. network
Fig. 7: UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery.
The UAVs form a tree network at SPE (τ = 0.3, τR = 0.2).
When SPE takes a form of Situation 4, then the best τ for A
is choosing the largest value in the set {cD, 1 − τR − (n −
1)cD, cD
⌈
n(kRA−1)
2 + 1
⌉
− τR}. When SPE of the game is of
another form except for Situations 3 and 4, then τ does not
affect the utility of A.
Proof. The attacker chooses a τ to maximize its utility
1 − τ − (
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
+ 1)cA while satisfying the conditions
b 1−τcA c ≥
⌊
1−τ−τR
cD
⌋
+ 1 and 1 − τ − τR < (n − 1)cD. The
objective function indicates that a smaller τ yields a higher
payoff of A. Thus, the best timing of attack is the smallest
τ resulting in an SPE of Situation 3. We relax the strict
inequality constraint by including the boundary, since when
τ = 1−τR(n−1)cD , D does not heal the network and Situation 3 is
still an SPE. Similarly, in Situation 4, those boundary values of
τ at the inequality constraint are feasible since D chooses not
to create a connected network if the payoffs are the same. 
In Situation 3, A prefers to attack the network in an early
phase which aligns with the fact that D does not recover the
network, and hence A receives the total rewards after τ . In
contrast, A chooses to compromise the network at a larger
phase τ in Situation 4 (though he does not really attack since
the network is not connected), which extracts all the utility
from time 0 to τ + τR.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use case studies of UAV-enabled commu-
nication networks to corroborate the obtained results. UAVs
become an emerging technology to serve as communication
relays, especially in disaster recovery scenarios in which the
existing communication infrastructures are out of service [42].
In the following, we consider a team of n = 10 UAVs.
The normalized unitary costs of creating and compromising a
communication link between UAVs for the operator/defender
and adversary are cD = 1/20 and cA = 1/8, respectively.
A. Illustrations of SPEs (Results in Section IV)
First, we illustrate SPE of the game when network resilience
cost and timing of attack are not considered (results in Section
Fig. 8: Utilities for D and A at SPE with varying τR. The SPEs and
the strategies of D and A are different with the increase of τR.
IV). Specifically, the adversary attacks the network at phase
τ = 0.3, and the defender heals it after τR = 0.2. The
UAV-enabled communication network configuration at SPE
is shown in Fig. 7 which admits a tree structure, and A
does not attack the network at SPE. In addition, the utilities
for D and A at SPE with τR ∈ [0, 0.6] are shown in Fig.
8. The SPE encounters switching with different τR. As τR
increases, the UAV network operator needs to allocate more
link resources to secure the network. Otherwise, the attacker
has an incentive to compromise the communication links with
a positive payoff. Specifically, when τR < 0.375, A does
not attack the UAV network, and D obtains a positive utility
by constructing a securely connected network. The secure
network admits various structures depending on τR. As shown
in Fig. 8, it can be in a tree network or a Harary network
and the SPEs are in Situation 1. When 0.375 < τR < 0.5,
the defender creates a connected network with the minimum
effort, i.e., 9 links, at phase 0. In this interval, the attacker will
successfully compromise the system during phase [τ, τ + τR],
and the defender heals the network afterward. The initially
connected network in this regime admits a tree structure, and
it may not be the same as the one created in the regime of
τR < 0.375. When τR exceeds 0.5, the defender does not
either protect or heal the network. The reason is that a larger
τR provides more incentives for the attacker to compromise the
links and receive a higher payoff. Furthermore, the aggregated
utility for the defender from two intervals, i.e., from the initial
phase to the attacking phase and from the recovery phase to
the terminal phase, is small, and hence it does not provide
sufficient incentive for the defender to protect and recover the
network. This also indicates that agile resilience is critical in
mitigating cyber threats in the infrastructure networks.
B. Strategic Resilience Planning
Next, we take into account the cost of network resilience
and study its impact on the SPE. The cost function of resilience
is RD(τR) = (τR − 1)4. The convexity of RD indicates that
the marginal cost of resilience increases as τR decreases. The
timing of attack is fixed to τ = 0.3 in this case study. The
Fig. 9: Defender’s utility with varying τR by considering the re-
silience cost. The optimal resilience planning is achieved at τR =
0.25. Values of τR in the interval [0, 0.16] ∪ [0.375, 0.6] are not
feasible since FD is negative.
equilibrium strategies of both players under costly network
resilience are illustrated in Fig. 9. Based on the analysis in
Section V-A, D chooses a τR that maximizes the net utility
FD. Though UD is larger in a regime with smaller values of
τR, the cost of agile network resilience is much higher for it
being the best strategy of designer. In addition, the defender
will not choose a τR in the intervals [0, 0.16]∪[0.375, 0.6] since
FD is negative. Hence, the optimal resilience planning of D
is τR = 0.25 which yields the optimal payoff FD = 0.183.
At this SPE, which falls into Situation 1, D creates a (10, 1)-
Harary network using 10 links initially and A does not attack.
C. Strategic Attacks and Resilience Planning
We finally investigate the strategic attack behavior of A.
In the following, the costs of creating and compromising a
communication link are selected as cD = 1/30 and cA =
1/20, respectively. The SPEs and the corresponding utilities
with τ = 0.5 and τ = 0.55 are shown in Fig. 10. Specifically,
Fig. 10(a) shows that the optimal resilience planning for D
at τ = 0.5 is τR = 0.37, leading to FD = 0.14. Note that
this SPE, where D constructs a tree network at phase 0 and
A attacks one link at τ with D healing the network afterward,
belongs to Situation 2 in regime 2 as shown in Table V. As
τ = 0.55, the best resilience planning of D is to adopt τR =
0.45 as illustrated in Fig. 10(b). At this SPE, which is a case of
Situation 3 in regime 2, D creates a tree network initially and
A attacks one link at τ , and D does not recover the network.
We can see that the SPE under optimal resilience planning
switches from Situation 2 to Situation 3 as τ increases. In
addition, the utility of A varies under different SPEs. Based on
Lemma 7, for an SPE in Situation 3, the attacker can increase
its utility by choosing an appropriate τ . Thus, we study the
impact of attacking phase τ on the SPE of the game, and
the result is depicted in Fig. 11. Note that the utility of D
is optimal under each τ in the sense that the resilience cost
RD is considered. When τ ∈ [0.4, 0.515), the SPE belongs to
Situation 2, and the optimal utilities of D and A remain as
(a) τ = 0.5
(b) τ = 0.55
Fig. 10: (a) and (b) illustrate the strategies of D and A with different
τ . The SPE under optimal resilience planning switches from Situation
2 to Situation 3 as τ changes from 0.5 to 0.55. In both (a) and (b),
the shaded grey areas, i.e., τR ∈ [0, 0.096] ∪ [0.01, 0.154], are not
feasible due to the negative value FD .
constants, where the resilience metric is given by τR = 0.37.
When τ ∈ [0.515, 0.6], the SPE switches to a case of Situation
3. In this interval, D does not recover after the attack and τR =
1 − τ . Furthermore, the optimal timing of attack is selected
as τ = 0.515, leading to UA = 0.435, the largest utility of
A. The result is in consistence with Lemma 7, indicating that
a smaller τ yields a higher utility of A when SPE admits a
form of Situation 3.
We next investigate the SPEs under the optimal resilience
planning of D and the strategic timing of attack of A together
over varying cost ratio cA/cD. We fix cD = 1/30 and the
ratio cA/cD varies. Figure 12 shows the obtained results. As
the cost ratio cA/cD increases, the utility of A decreases
monotonically. When cA/cD ∈ [1, 2.2], the strategies of D
and A does not change and the SPE belongs to Situation 3.
Since the optimal τR and τ stay the same in this interval, the
utility of D remains unchanged. When cA/cD ∈ [2.2, 2.4], the
SPE switches to Situation 2 and D heals the network after the
attack. Since the recovery is agile (τR becomes smaller), D’s
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Fig. 11: Players’ utilities at SPE with varying τ under the optimal
resilience planning. The best timing of attack is τ = 0.515 with
optimal τR = 0.37.
Fig. 12: Players’ utilities, optimal resilience planing τR, strategic
timing of attack τ , at SPE with varying cA/cD .
utility increases and A’s utility decreases dramatically in this
interval. Furthermore, the strategic timing of attack τ varies
to account for the better recovery speed τR and the increasing
cost of attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established a two-player three-stage
dynamic game for the infrastructure network protection and
recovery. We have characterized the strategic strategies of the
network defender and the attacker by analyzing the subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game. With case studies on
UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery,
we have observed that with an agile response to the attack, the
defender can obtain a positive utility by creating a securely
connected infrastructure network. Furthermore, a higher level
resilience saves link resources for the defender and yields a
better payoff. In addition, a longer duration between the attack
and recovery phases induces a higher level of cyber threats
to the infrastructures. Future work would investigate dynamic
games with incomplete information of the defender on the
attacking time and attack cost. Another direction is to design
SPE strategies under the scenarios that the feasible action sets
of both defender and attacker are constrained.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof. When τR/cA > n − 1, A always attacks the network
at phase τ , and hence Situation 1 is not possible. The SPE in
Situation 1 satisfies U (1)A > U
(2)
A and U
(1)
A > U
(3)
A . Thus, the
goal of D is to create a network with the minimal cost such
that all nodes have a degree of at least
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
+ 1 = kRA + 1,
and at least
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
+ 1 = kHA + 1 links need to be removed
to yield a network with k+2 components (i.e., the minimum
(k + 1)-cut requires at least
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
+ 1 links). For kRA ≥ 1,
we consider the strategy of D that consists in creating an
(|N |, kRA + 1)-Harary network. Thus,
|E1| ≥

⌈
n(kRA+1)
2
⌉
if kRA ≥ 2,
n if kRA = 1,
n− 1 otherwise.
(6)
Let kHD ≡
⌊
1−τ
cD
⌋
. First, suppose that kHD < k
H
A , and at
phase 0, D constructs a network with (n−1)+k links for some
k ≤ kHD . Consider the strategy for A that consists in attacking
randomly kHA links. Since k
H
A > k
H
D ≥ k, then the resulting
network has less than n−1 links and is thus disconnected. At
phase τ + τR, D can reconstruct at most (n− 1)+ kHD − (n−
1)−k = kHD−k links. Then, the network at phase τ+τR would
contain at most (n−1)+k−kHA+kHD−k = (n−1)+kHD−kHA <
n − 1 links, and the network is disconnected. Therefore, no
SPE exists in Situation 1 if kHD < k
H
A .
Conversely, suppose that kHD ≥ kHA . Then, we have kRA ≤⌊
τR
cD
⌋
. Furthermore, kHA ≤ kHD ⇒ 1cA − 1cD < 11−τ ⇒
1−τ−τR
cA
− 1−τ−τRcD < 1−τ−τR1−τ < 1, which gives
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
≤
k. Then, by definition, kHA =
⌊
1−τ
cA
⌋
=
⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
+ τRcA
⌋
≤⌊
1−τ−τR
cA
⌋
+
⌊
τR
cA
⌋
+ 1 ≤ k + kRA + 1. Hence, we obtain
kHA ≤ k + kRA + 1. Based on the obtained results, we next
focus on four distinct cases and derive their corresponding
SPEs.
Case 1 (k > 0 and kRA > 1): If kRA ≥ 3, then kRA + 1 link
removals are needed to disconnect the network, and any further
additional component creation requires to remove at least 2
links. Thus, at least 2k + kRA + 1 link removals are necessary
so that the network has k + 2 components. Then, based on
2k + kRA + 1 > k
H
A + 1, A does not attack the network. If
kRA = 2, and if k ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
, then at least kRA+1+2k link removals
are required, and otherwise (i.e., k >
⌊
n
2
⌋
) kRA + 1 + k link
removals are necessary. Thus, A does not attack the network.
Case 2 (k = 0 and kRA > 1): In this case, we have
kHA ≤ kRA + 1. A only needs to disconnect the network since
D does not heal due to k = 0. Thus, if kRA > 1, D creates an
(|N |, kHA + 1)-Harary network at phase 0.
Case 3 (kRA = 0): In this case, if kHA = k, then D creates
a tree network which is an optimal strategy. Otherwise, kHA =
k + 1 in which case D creates a ring network.
Case 4 (kRA = 1): In this scenario, if kHA = k+ 1, then the
ring network, i.e., the (|N |, 2)-Harary network, is optimal for
D. Otherwise, if kHA = k+2, then D needs to create a network
of minimal cost such that no k cut exists with k+1 links. To
this end, we consider the following network. For each i ∈ N ,
we create a link between nodes i and (i + 1) mod n (ring
network). Then, we connect node k to node 2k, and connect
node 2k to node 3k, and so on. If
⌊
n
k
⌋
is even, then we connect
node k
⌊
n
k
⌋
to node 0. Otherwise, we connect node 0 to any
node of the network excluding 1 and n−1. Thus, the resulting
network contains no k cut of size k + 1 links and is minimal
in terms of the number of links. The resulting utility for D is
UD = 1− (n+
⌊
n
k
⌋
+
⌈bnk c
2
⌉
)cD.
By defining δ as in (4), the condition 1 < δcD ensures a
positive utility for D at SPE of Situation 1. The condition
1− τ < (δ−n+1)cD guarantees that the SPE is achieved in
Situation 1 instead of in Situation 3. 
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